USE OF MILITARY FORCE

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• His overwhelming obsession as president was to avoid war.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• Ike saw WWI as an opportunity for career advancement, like most young officers.  His began to appreciate the cost of war when he saw the battlefields and cemeteries of the Great War while working under General Pershing in the 1920s. 

• WWII completed his transformation.  He smelled the rotting flesh of battlefields and wrote to thousands of grieving mothers and wives.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• He learned to hate war and dedicated the rest of his career to world peace.  But he did not embrace pacifism and appeasement.  He forged a middle ground between these positions and warmongering. 

• Ike would only go to war if a vital national interest was threatened.  Even then, war was the last resort until all other tools were exhausted.  (Waging Peace, 1953: Fighting to End All War)

• He had two other conditions for going to war: Congressional approval and an international coalition consisting of core allies and the countries of the region.  (Johnson, Modern Times)

• Ike sought a middle ground between the Constitution’s requirement that Congress declare war and Truman’s pragmatic precedent for the president controlling foreign policy on a day-to-day basis. Ike’s solution was for Congress to pass broad frameworks approving of potential military actions in regions that would allow the president to shape national security policy there.  Two key examples are the Formosa Resolution, which allowed Ike to potentially attack China during the First Taiwan Crisis, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, in which the US pledged to assist any Middle Eastern country resisting communism. (Waxman, Remembering Eisenhower’s Formosa AUMF)

• He said, “The United States cannot be strong enough to go to every spot in the world, where our enemies may use force or the threat of force, and defend those nations.” (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• He said that not every summit must result in final solutions.  Heads of state needed to get to know each other better.

• He knew not to overreact to foreign crises, because small wars could morph into big wars.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• He rejected the idea of preventive war.  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• He was the least interventionist of any modern president.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• He sought to reduce conventional military forces so the US could not easily engage in a limited war like Korea.  This angered his friends in the military.  He was upset that JFK restored America’s limited war capacity, which paved the way to Vietnam.  He predicted, “This can make the military machine so big it just has to be used.” (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

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COLONIALISM

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• He was a citizen of the world, having lived in Panama, France, and the Philippines.  WWII took him all over Europe and North Africa.  He was uniquely sensitive to the Third World and understood colonialism in a way other presidents did not.  (Susan Eisenhower, Mrs. Ike)

• He believed America had a proud tradition of anti-colonialism dating back to 1776.  When Nixon told him that Algeria was not ready for independence from France, Ike replied, “The United States could not possibly maintain that freedom - independence - liberty - were necessary to us, but not to others.”

• Ike described Dutch colonialism as bringing Western civilization, economic progress, and orderly administration to the East Indies but said it was understandable the Indonesians wanted their independence. (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change)

• Ike said he agreed with Nasser on the issue of colonialism.  It was impractical for European colonialism to continue and he wanted America to be on the right side of the issue.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• He believed that most of the Third World would prefer communism to colonialism, even though colonialism brought a higher standard of living. (Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower)

• Ike believed the Third World only cared about colonialism when it was whites oppressing another race, not whites oppressing whites.  That’s why the world cared more about Suez than Hungary.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

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ASIA: KOREA, CHINA, VIETNAM, INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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• Ike entered office with less understanding of the Far East than he had about Europe or the Middle East.  He relied more on Dulles when shaping policy for this region.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

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Korea

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• He saw North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950 as part of worldwide communist aggression.  He initially supported Truman’s intervention into the Korean War, saying, “We’ll have dozens of Koreas soon if we don’t take a firm stand.”  (McCullough, Truman)

• However, Ike believed Truman could have deterred North Korea’s aggression if he had not demobilized the military so quickly after WWII and had not withdrawn all American forces from South Korea in 1948.  (Eisenhower, I Shall Go to Korea Speech)

• Ike disagreed with Truman’s decision to allow MacArthur to send UN forces north of the 38th parallel in an attempt to unify the Korean Peninsula.  He believed the UN’s mission in Korea was to repel the North’s aggression, not to reunite the country through force.  (Korda, Ike: An American Hero)

• The Korean War became a stalemate when China entered the conflict on the North’s side.  Ike ran for president in large part to end the war.  He pledged he would visit the front lines if elected.  He met with General Mark Clark, the UN commander in Korea, after the election.  Clark and Sigmund Rhee, South Korea’s leader, wanted to launch a new offensive against the communists and attack the Chinese mainland.  Ike disagreed, saying, “I know how you feel militarily, but I have a mandate from the people to stop this fighting.  That’s my decision.”  Ike did not think the war was worth the cost in UN lives and was prepared to codify the stalemate in an armistice.  (Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years)

• Dulles opposed Ike’s decision to seek an armistice in Korea.  He thought an armistice with China made America look weak.  Ike ignored him, saying, “If Mr. Dulles and his sophisticated advisers really mean that they cannot talk peace seriously, then I’m in the wrong pew.”  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Soon after taking office, Ike sent a message to the Chinese government, through India, saying that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to break the stalemate in Korea.  Mao and Zhou Enlai knew of Ike’s role in WWII and that he had used every tool at his disposal to defeat Hitler’s Germany.  They believed his threat and began negotiating with Dulles, leading to an armistice in July 1953, six months after Ike’s inauguration.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• Sigmund Rhee, South Korea’s leader, did not want an armistice.  He wanted to reunify the peninsula under his control.  Ike said he did not, “understand the mental processes of the Oriental… we don’t know how they will react.”  Ike threatened to cut off aid to South Korea, forcing Rhee to accept the armistice.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Ending the Korean War was Ike’s biggest achievement in his first year as president.  He spoke to the American people the night the armistice was signed.  He said, “We have won an armistice on a single battleground--not peace in the world.”  He finished his speech by quoting Lincoln’s Second Inaugural, “‘With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.’  This is our resolve and our dedication.” (Eisenhower, Television Address to the American People on the Signing of the Korean Armistice)

• Rhee wrote Ike in early 1954 saying that he wanted to invade North Korea.  Ike said he would not assist the invasion and Rhee’s army would probably be destroyed.  Furthermore, Ike said he would veto a bilateral mutual defense treaty the Senate had passed.  This would deny South Korea funds meant for economic rehabilitation, not for a new military offensive.  Rhee abandoned his idea.  Ike promised he would use nuclear weapons if China or North Korea attacked the South again.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

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China

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• Truman sent George Marshall to China in 1946 to broker a peace agreement between Mao Zedong’s communists and Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists to end the Chinese Civil War.  Marshall failed in his mission and Mao won the war in 1949, creating the People’s Republic of China.  Chiang established a regime in Taiwan.  Ike privately blamed Marshall, his mentor, for Mao’s victory.  He said, “The reason we lost China was because Marshall had insisted upon Chiang taking communists into his government, against Chiang’s judgment.” (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• Ike’s first showdown with Mao was in ending the Korean War.  Soon after taking office, Ike sent a message to the Chinese government, through India, saying that he was prepared to use nuclear weapons to break the stalemate in Korea.  Mao and Zhou Enlai knew of Ike’s role in WWII and that he had used every tool at his disposal to defeat Hitler’s Germany.  They believed his threat and began negotiating with Dulles, leading to an armistice in July 1953.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• Mao’s forces began an artillery barrage against Quemoy and Matsu, islands off the coast of Taiwan (Formosa) in September 1954.  Mao wanted to invade and annex Taiwan, toppling Chiang’s regime.  Ike did not care much for Quemoy and Matsu but knew he would have to intervene to save Taiwan.  The French had recently withdrawn from Indochina, and the West could not lose another ally in Asia.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged Ike to launch air strikes, including nuclear weapons, against China to break up Mao’s forces.  Ike refused.  He said, “We’re not talking about a brushfire war. We’re talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we’re not going to impose limits on our military actions, as in Korea. And if we get involved in a general war, the logical enemy is Russia, not China, so we’ll have to strike there.” (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• Ike was determined to save Taiwan while avoiding World War III.  He considered asking Chiang to abandon the islands while fortifying Taiwan.  Ike convinced Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution, which pledged American support to Taiwan while keeping the fate of Quemoy and Matsu ambiguous.  Mao was left unsure what would provoke an American response.  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• The crisis continued into March 1955.  Ike was scheduled to deliver a press conference.  Press Secretary Jim Hagerty warned Ike he would be asked a question about the Taiwan Crisis.  Ike replied, “Don’t worry, Jim.  If that question comes up, I’ll just confuse them.”  One of the first questions was whether the US would use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu.  Ike’s answer was deliberately confusing, “The only thing I know about war are two things: the most changeable factor in war is human nature in its day-by-day manifestation; but the only unchanging factor in war is human nature… So I think you have to wait, and that is the kind of prayerful decision that may some day face a president.”  After the conference Ike told Hagerty he must have “given fits to the Russian and Chinese translators trying to explain to their bosses what he meant.”  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• The Chinese government was unsure whether Ike would use nuclear weapons.  They ceased their aggression, ending the crisis.  Ike had stood up to Mao without triggering WWIII; it was a tour de force of crisis management.  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• A Second Taiwan Crisis occurred in 1958.  Chiang had reinforced Quemoy and Matsu in order to provoke Mao into attacking Taiwan.  Chiang hoped this would lead to an American-Taiwanese invasion of China to return him to power.  Mao, for his part, wanted to test Ike’s resolve and began shelling the islands.  Ike had none of it.  He refused to let Chiang escalate the crisis and reached out to Mao, through Poland, to find a diplomatic solution.  Khrushchev threatened WWIII if the US attacked China with nuclear weapons.  Ike ignored the Soviet dictator and defused the conflict between Mao and Chiang.  Mao began only bombing the islands on odd-numbered days, reducing the crisis into a farce.  The violence ended by the end of the year.  (Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years)

• Ike had come to the brink of using nuclear weapons against China on three separate occasions.  However, he foresaw the possibility of a Sino-American rapprochement that could divide China and the USSR.  Ike had fought Hitler during WWII but was now allied with Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany; he knew enemies did not have to be enemies forever.  He said, “Communist China is not yet a member of the UN. But it would be foolish to completely tie our hands on this matter for the future. Remember 1945 when Germany was our deadly enemy. Who would have thought that a few years later Germany would be our friend?”  The 1950s was the height of the Cold War; a Sino-American rapprochement was impossible.  This diplomatic breakthrough was left to Richard Nixon, Ike’s protégé, who went to China in 1972.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

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Vietnam

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• The French spent the early 1950s fighting to maintain a colony in Indochina, which contains Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.  Ike predicted they would fail.  He said the French could not convince the Vietnamese that they, white Europeans, were fighting for their freedom while the Vietnamese communists, led by Ho Chi Mihn, sought to enslave them.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Ike sent the French weapons to fight Ho Chi Mihn but was determined to keep America out of Indochina.  He was critical of the French’s decision to make a last stand at Diem Bien Phu.  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• The Vietnamese communists overwhelmed the French at Diem Bien Phu.  Ike was determined to save Indochina from communism, saying, “the collapse of Indochina would produce a chain reaction which would result in the fall of all of Southeast Asia to the Communists.”  But he also resisted intervention.  He wanted to preserve America’s anti-colonial reputation, which was to be more guarded than Indochina.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• The Joint Chiefs and NSC were less concerned with accusations of colonialism.  They insisted on using nuclear weapons to destroy Ho Chi Mihn’s army and rescue the French.  Ike immediately dismissed this idea and said, “You boys must be crazy.  We can’t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than ten years.  My God.”  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• Ho Chi Mihn defeated the French, who withdrew from Indochina in March 1954.  The British and Chinese divided Vietnam between North and South.  Dulles, Zhou Enlai, and other statesmen met in Geneva to discuss Indochina.  The Conference decided that an election would be held in North and South Vietnam in 1956.  Most predicted Ho Chi Mihn would win and would unify the country.  Ike was content to let this happen because he did not think Vietnam affected vital US interests.  But Ho announced his intention to then annex Cambodia and Laos.  Ike termed this threat of communist expansion the “Domino Theory.”  He looked the other way when Ngo Dinh Diem, the leader of South Vietnam, cancelled the election.  Conflict broke out between North and South Vietnam.  Ike sent South Vietnam 600 military and economic advisers.  (Johnson, Modern Times)

• US presence in Vietnam remained minimal until Ike left office.  He and JFK discussed Indochina during the transition between their administrations.  JFK asked whether to intervene in Vietnam or to form a coalition government between North and South.  Ike said neither option was acceptable.  Intervention would look like colonialism.  A coalition government would lead to communist domination.  JFK asked for an alternative.  Ike recommended bluffing with nuclear weapons, as he did, to keep China out the region.  JFK and his team later claimed Ike advised him to send in troops, but this is wrong.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• Ike did not believe the US should assassinate foreign leaders and was shocked by rumors that JFK and the CIA killed President Diem, an ally, in November 1963.  He did not believe that JFK would kill a fellow Catholic.  (Korda, Ike: An America Hero)

• Ike said the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave LBJ the legal right to defend American bases in South Vietnam.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Ike disagreed with LBJ’s decision to escalate the Vietnam War, but he said now that LBJ had committed US credibility to South Vietnam’s survival he could not afford to fail.  The US needed credibility to operate on the world stage, negotiate with major powers, and make military bluffs.  (David Eisenhower, Going Home to Glory)

• Ike opposed LBJ’s gradual escalation in Vietnam. LBJ couldn’t attack North Vietnam’s center of gravity if he refused to invade the north.  He said that LBJ should use overwhelming military force, which Ike had used against Germany in WWII.  It was irresponsible to leave American troops in harm’s way when a more aggressive strategy to go into North Vietnam and capture Hanoi would end the war faster and reduce casualties.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Victory took precedence over any other consideration.  Ike advised sending forces into Laos and Cambodia, if necessary.  He said placing mines within North Vietnamese harbors was good strategy but questionable under international law. 

• He criticized LBJ for enacting Great Society social programs during wartime.  He predicted this would lead to inflation, which happened in the 1970s.  He advised LBJ to place the economy on a wartime basis and ask Congress for a declaration of war on North Vietnam.  (David Eisenhower, Going Home to Glory)

• Ike publically supported LBJ, even though he criticized him in private.  He thought ex-presidents should support the incumbent’s foreign policy.  He was impatient with uninformed criticism of LBJ, even if the opinions reflected his own.  He strongly disapproved of the anti-war movement.  (David Eisenhower, Going Home to Glory)

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India and Pakistan

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• Ike said Nehru was wrong to say that Western imperialism and Soviet communism were equivalent.  Ike told Nehru that passive resistance had worked against the British because “the British had a conscience.”  But passively resisting the communists would give Nehru and India, “a rude awakening.” (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• Ike said Nehru, along with most of India and Pakistan, allowed, “emotion rather than reason to dictate policy.”  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Treasury Secretary Humphrey wanted to cut aid to India because he thought the country was becoming socialist.  Ike replied, “George, you don’t understand the Indian problem. Their situation isn’t like our situation. We can operate a free-enterprise economy, but it depends on a whole lot of underpinnings that the Indians simply don’t have. If I were the Prime Minister of India, I would have to resort to many measures which you would call socialistic. So it’s quite mistaken idea that we should judge the Indian situation or the Indian needs or the Indian policies by criteria which may be relevant to us.”  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Ike believed than an alliance with India would be more beneficial, in the long-term, than an alliance with Pakistan. (Markey, No Exit from Pakistan)

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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• Ike thought the Middle East might be the most strategically important region in the world.  He and Dulles sought regional peace and stability to keep oil flowing to the West and to contain Soviet influence.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

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View of Arabs

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• Ike’s view of Arabs and the Middle East was shaped by his time in North Africa during WWII.  He described them as rooted in violence, emotion, ignorance, and a prejudice against white people.  (Said, Orientalism)

• Ike believed Arabs were inherently anti-democratic, saying, “If you go and live with these Arabs, you will find that they simply don’t understand our ideas of freedom or human dignity. They have lived so long under dictatorships of one form or another, how can we expect them to run successfully a free government?”

• Ike believed that the Western World needed Arabs and access to Middle Eastern oil more than Arabs needed the West.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

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Iran

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• Mohammad Mossadegh and the communist Tudeh Party had already nationalized the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and triggered a crisis with Britain by the time Ike was in office.  The situation became worse.  Mossadegh dissolved Parliament and ruled by decree.  The Tudeh started riots across Tehran.  The Soviets gave Mossadegh financial aid to keep the Iranian government functional.  Ike feared Iran was moving to a communist government and could become a Soviet client state.  (Takeyh, What Really Happened in Iran)

• Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, warned Ike that drastic action was needed to save the Shah and prevent Iran from going communist.  Dulles said, “If Iran falls to communists, there is little doubt that in short order the other areas of the Middle East, with sixty percent of the world’s oil supply, would fall into communist orbit.”  (Lust, The Middle East)

• The CIA proposed a plan called Operation Ajax to have the Shah to dismiss Mossadegh.   Ike initially opposed this idea, thinking a loan could pull Iran away from the Kremlin.  This did not work, and Ike approved Ajax.  Ike often spoke of equality of nations.  Backing this coup attempt was hypocritical.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Mossadegh ignored the Shah’s dismissal and forced the Shah out of the country.  This marked the end of CIA and MI6 involvement.  But the Shah’s dismissal angered his supporters, who protested.  Iran’s clerics took advantage of this and funded additional protests to oust Mossadegh.  The Shah returned to power and Iran became an ally of the West until the 1979 Revolution.  After 1979, Iran’s clerics put full blame for the coup on America and Britain.  (Takeyh, What Really Happened in Iran)

• Ike was dissatisfied with the Shah.  He said that US aid to Iran, “Merely perpetuates the ruling class and intensifies the enormous differences between the rich and the poor.  How could we continue to support any governments which does not carry out land reform and which would not lay out any constructive program for the betterment of the situation?”  Nonetheless, Ike and subsequent American presidents remained allied with the Shah for practical reasons.  (Lust, The Middle East)

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Saudi Arabia

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• Ike strengthened America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, which was established under FDR.  He hoped to turn the country into Egypt’s rival, isolating Nasser and forcing Nasser to abandon Arab nationalism and join the quest for regional peace. (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• Ike described Saudi King Saud as “strictly medieval.  When he says ‘my people’ he means just that.”  (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• Ike knew that the alliance with Saudi Arabia was critical for America’s presence in the Middle East.  He showed extreme deference to King Saud by meeting him at the airport, breaking American precedent.  Ike also promised King Saud that no American Jew would work in the American air force base in Saudi Arabia.  (Lust, The Middle East)

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Israel, Egypt, and the Suez Crisis

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• Ike did not know any Jews growing up. He told a friend that as boy that he did not think there were any Jews on Earth, and that they were “all in heaven as angels.” (Runkle, Tablet Magazine)

• Ike’s military forces were key to defeating Nazi Germany and ending the Holocaust.  He became the governor of the American-occupation zone in Germany after the war.  Ike met David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Zionist movement, at this time.  At Ben-Gurion’s urging, Ike redistributed German farms to train Jews in agriculture.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• Ike gave humanitarian aid to the Holocaust survivors, but this did not translate into support for a Jewish state in Palestine.  He feared that supporting a Jewish state would turn Arabs away from the US and toward the USSR.  He said of Israel, “But now it was done.  We’ll have to live with it,” suggesting his dedication to Israeli security.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• Most Israelis were disappointed by Ike’s 1952 election victory.  Truman had supported Israel and had endorsed Stevenson.  Israelis feared Ike, a military man, would treat the Middle East as a realist through cold calculations instead of moral considerations.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt in 1952.  He preached Arab nationalism and spoke of uniting all Arabs into a single state.  He denounced Israel.  Ike feared Nasser’s pan-Arabism and the possibility that Nasser could unite the Arabs and ally with the USSR.  He compared Nasser’s bid for Middle Eastern hegemony to Rommel.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike analyzed the Arab-Israeli conflict in his diary, writing, “The oil of the Arab world has grown increasingly important to all of Europe. The economy of European countries would collapse if those oil supplies were cut off. If the economy of Europe would collapse, the US would be in a situation of which the difficulty can scarcely be exaggerated. On the other hand, Israel, a tiny country surrounded by enemies, is nonetheless one we had recognized, and top of this, that has a very strong position in the heart and emotions of the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the Jew throughout twenty-five hundred years of history.”  (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• NSC 5428 was issued in 1954.  It said that peace between Arab states and the Israelis was America’s ultimate objective.  Ike offered foreign aid to any Middle Eastern country that would make peace with Israel. (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike said the Palestinian refugees should be integrated into Arab countries if their reintegration into Israel proved impossible.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• Ike opposed Israeli settlements into disputed territories.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• He sought to treat the Arabs and Israelis equally and did not want to be seen as Israel’s protector.  He refused to sell Israel weapons even after the Soviets sold weapons to Egypt because he wanted to prevent a Middle Eastern arms race.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Nasser sought to play the US and USSR off of one another.  Ike played Nasser’s game and pledged financial support to help Nasser build the Aswan Dam in 1955 as long as Egypt worked toward peace with Israel.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike had a heart attack in September 1955.  Nasser officially recognized Mao’s People’s Republic of China while Ike was in the hospital.  Dulles, who was running US foreign policy, retaliated by severing aid to the Dam.  This led to Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal in July 1956.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike believed Nasser was within his rights to nationalize the Canal, since it was located in Egypt.  Ike knew that Americans would not want the Panama Canal placed under international control; Egyptians felt similarly about Suez.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Britain and France, which had controlled the Suez Canal before Nasser nationalized it, were outraged.  They wanted it back.  Ike warned them against rash action and decided not to work in lock step with the Europeans on this issue.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Britain’s Anthony Eden and France’s Rene Coty knew that Ike faced reelection in November 1956.  They timed their scheme for the election so Ike would be unable to react.  They convinced Israel to invade the Sinai in October 1956, beginning the most dangerous crisis of Ike’s presidency.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike was campaigning when he learned of the Israeli invasion.  He immediately returned to the White House and shouted at Dulles, “Foster, you tell ‘em, God-damit, that we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the UN, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.”  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• Israel’s aggression led Ike to believe that Ben-Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister, was an extremist who cared more about conquering more land than about peace.  He angrily referred to Ben-Gurion as an “Albert Einstein-looking midget” during the crisis.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Ike was determined to stop Israel, and even contemplated using force.  That would cost him reelection, but Ike was determined to restore the peace, no matter the political cost.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Britain and France gave an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, with one condition being that London and Paris got control of the Suez Canal.  Ike denounced the ultimatum and called it “Victorian.”  Israel accepted the ultimatum (Ben-Gurion knew of the proposal in advance) but Nasser rejected it.  Britain and France dropped paratroopers into Egypt to retake the Canal and topple Nasser.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Britain’s Parliament gave Eden permission to continue the war with a 270-217 vote.  Ike muttered, “I could not dream of committing this nation to war on such a vote.”  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev, who were simultaneously crushing the Hungarian Revolution, escalated the Suez Crisis by sending messages to Eden, Coty, and Ben-Gurion that said the Soviets wanted to restore peace to the Middle East and suggested they would use force to do so.  They even said they would use nuclear weapons against the Allies.  Bulganin and Khrushchev also sent a letter to Ike saying the US and USSR should ally together to fight Britain, France, and Israel.  (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• Ike immediately rejected the Soviet proposal.  He believed Bulganin and Khrushchev were exploiting the Suez crisis to “extend the Iron Curtain to the Middle East.”  Ike said, “If these fellows [the Soviets] start something, we may have to hit them with everything in the bucket.”  He put America’s navy and nuclear forces on alert.  The Soviets knew this was a warning that any intervention into the Middle East or against Britain and France meant World War III.  They decided against further escalation.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike sanctioned Israel and pressured the British pound.  Britain was forced to liquidate much of its gold and dollar reserves.  Treasury Secretary Humphrey offered the British government a $1.5 billion loan if they withdrew from Egypt.  Eden asked the IMF to make available the dollar funds Britain had on deposit.  Humphrey blocked the move.  Britain capitulated to Ike’s demands and withdrew on November 6.  France and Israel soon followed. (Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace)

• A UN peacekeeping force moved in to secure the canal before it was returned to Egyptian control.  Ike insisted that none of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council should be among the peacekeeping force.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike later compared his management of the Suez Crisis to his role in WWII.  He had simultaneously dealt with the Hungarian Revolution and won a landslide reelection.  (Nichols, Eisenhower 1956)

• Ike proposed the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957.  The Doctrine proposed sending aid and weapons to Middle Eastern countries in case of Soviet attack.  Israel endorsed the Doctrine while Nasser opposed it.  This was a turning point for Ike.  He saw Israel as dedicated to the West and viewed Nasser as a Soviet puppet.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• Ben-Gurion visited Ike in 1960.  Ike told his guest that Israel would never be destroyed.  They left respecting one another.  (Alteras, Eisenhower and Israel)

• The US, through the IAEA, gave Israel nuclear material.  France helped the Israelis construct nuclear weapons under ground.  American U2 planes discovered this in December 1960, leading to a debate within Ike’s NSC.  Ike was indifferent but suggested sending inspectors.  The administration decided that no solution was possible until JFK took office in January 1961.  (Cohen, How Israel Hid its Secret Nuclear Weapons Program)

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Lebanon

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• Ike feared the Suez Crisis marked the end of Britain and France’s control of the Middle East and would allow the Soviets to fill the vacuum.  His response was the Eisenhower Doctrine, which said the US would send weapons and aid to Middle Eastern countries if the Soviets attacked them.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Lebanon’s pro-Western Christian President Chamoun did not sever relations with Britain and France during the Suez Crisis.  This angered Lebanon’s Muslims, bringing the country to the brink of civil war.  The UN ignored Chamoun’s calls for help.  Chamoun turned to the US.  (Lust, The Middle East)

• Ike and his administration wanted to bolster Chamoun against Egypt and Syria.  The NSC debated the issue until Ike interrupted Dulles, “Foster, I’ve already made up my mind.  We’re going in.”  Ike said access to the Persian Gulf oil, a vital interest, was at stake.  He wanted a British commander to lead the operation, but Dulles said there was still resentment among Muslims toward Britain because of Suez.  Ike agreed and said he’d appoint an American commander, but still wanted British support.  The US acted unilaterally.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• 14,000 American troops entered Lebanon in July 1958 as part of Operation Blue Bat.  The American presence stabilized the situation.  They saw no fighting.  Ike sent Robert Murphy as his personal representative.  Murphy brokered a compromise, allowing the Americans to withdraw in October.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who replaced Eden, recommended expanding the operation into Iraq and Syria.  Ike said this would be opening Pandora’s Box.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Khrushchev and Arab leaders denounced America’s intervention in Lebanon.  Ike thought this was unfair.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• Blue Bat showed that the US could quickly react to small crises.  It was the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine.  The Doctrine marked the beginning of large-scale US involvement in the Middle East. (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)​

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Africa

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• Ike led the UN’s effort to aid education in Africa.  He wanted wealthy nations to help developing countries and wanted to aid the underdeveloped areas of Africa.  (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• Belgium withdrew from the Congo in 1960. Black Congolese attacked white Congolese, leading to Belgium sending soldiers back into the country.  Patrice Lumumba, the new country’s first Prime Minister, went to the US for help.  Ike and his team thought Lumumba “odd” and “ill equipped to lead a modern country.”  They also feared he was a Khrushchev protégé. Ike spend several months following the Congo Crisis, determined not to let the Soviets enter the situation.  They did not, but Ike remained frustrated with Lumumba’s ineffective leadership.  Ike darkly muttered he wished Lumumba would “fall into a river of crocodiles.”  Lumumba was pushed from power in September 1960.  (Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years)

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LATIN AMERICA

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• Ike was interested in the region since his youth.  Before going to West Point he considered a business venture in Argentina.  He served in Panama under Fox Conner in the early 1920s.  He appreciated the Canal’s importance and thought it should be returned to Panama’s control.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Ike expanded aid to Latin American countries.  This led to protests throughout the region, who thought the US wanted to maintain a status quo they saw as oppressive.  Ike acknowledged this was self-defeating.  He changed the programs, leading to the 1960 Act of Bogota and the Charter of Punta del Este.  These compacts said aid would only be given to countries whose governments conducted reforms for economic and political democracy.  Ike believed aid had to discriminate against regressive countries to be effective.  (Eisenhower, Waging Peace)

• He was willing to support social and economic reforms in Latin America as long as they did not bring a communist regime to power.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Ike accepted a leftist revolution in Bolivia as that county reformed the Big Tin companies.  Ike sent them food aid to prevent starvation.  This moderated the revolution and forged good will between Bolivia and the US.  Bolivia’s leader, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, said that Ike proved that strong countries don’t always exploit weak ones, which communists claimed.  Ike also showed that it was only communism he opposed, not all revolutions.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• A left wing government took power in Venezuela in 1958 and began land reform.  Ike supported their efforts and helped defend the country from Castro’s subversion.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Ike knew most Mexicans revered their 1910 Revolution, even though it had only partially succeeded.  “Nevertheless,” Ike concluded, “it is better than what they had.”  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• He said the problem with Latin America is illiteracy and poverty.  (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• He did not believe in dollar diplomacy and new American intervention into Central America and the Caribbean had damaged the country’s image in the region. (Kreig, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman)

• Ike supported the Organization of American States.  He met with Milton, his brother and an expert on Latin America, to discuss the region every weekend.  Milton’s efforts led to the Alliance for Progress, although JFK got the credit.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

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Guatemala

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• Juan Jose Arevalo was elected president of Guatemala in 1944.  A leftist, he survived twenty-five military coup attempts in his six-year reign.  His protégé, Jacobo Arbenz, succeeded him in 1951.  Arbenz was a nationalist and Marxist-sympathizer.  He was critical of US policy toward Latin America and believed American corporations stole Guatemalan resources.  He set out to redistribute land owned by corporations to his nation’s poor.  Some of the land belonged to United Fruit, a US-based banana company.  (Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire)

• Ike met with Ann Whitman, his private secretary, and her husband, Edmund, in early 1953.  Edmund was the director of public relations for United Fruit.  Ike asked about the situation in Guatemala, where communists were penetrating labor unions, agriculture, and the press.  Edmund said Arbenz was a communist who would not compromise with United Fruit.  He also said that the majority of Guatemalans opposed communism.  (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change)

• John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had also done legal work for United Fruit.  However, Foster Dulles said the threat of communism in Guatemala was a bigger problem that what happened to United Fruit.  Ike added that placing a corporation’s interest over an entire country was shortsighted and Victorian. 

• Fear grew that Arbenz was a communist.  The CIA labeled him a “Soviet pawn.”  Milton, Ike’s brother, and Beetle Smith, Ike’s chief of staff during WWII and Undersecretary of State as president, convinced Ike that Arbenz was communist.  Ike believed communism in Guatemala could lead to the fall of Mexico, Panama, and Cuba.  He believed Arbenz was a threat to Guatemalans, the region, and the US.  (Thomas, Ike’s Bluff)

• Arbenz knew he had made an enemy of the Eisenhower Administration and his own military.  He tried to protect himself by building his own militia and bought weapons from the Eastern Bloc.  This set off a red flag for the US.  Ike ordered a blockade of Guatemala to block further Soviet weapon imports, even though it was peacetime.  (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change)

• The CIA organized an anti-Arbenz unit of Guatemalan rebels under Colonel Costello Armas in Honduras.  Armas launched his campaign in June 1954.  The CIA also flew planes over Guatemala City to make Armas appear more power and projected radio broadcasts across Guatemala that said the rebels were winning.  (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change)

• Armas’ force was weak, but his entry into Guatemala triggered the military’s uprising against Arbenz.  Arbenz was isolated and lacked public support.  He resigned from power.  (Eisenhower, Mandate for Change)

• Guatemala’s neighbors, Nicaragua, Honduras, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic all endorsed the coup.  A US Senate resolution endorsed the coup with one dissenting vote.  Vice President Nixon strongly supported it, saying Arbenz would be remembered for terror and hatred.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• Ike met with CIA chiefs after the operation and proudly told them, “You’ve averted a Soviet beachhead in this hemisphere.”  This was one perspective.  A murderous military dictatorship was established.  Guatemala was racked with political strife for the rest of the century.  (Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire)

• Ike often spoke of equality of nations.  Backing this coup was hypocritical.

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Cuba

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• Fulgencio Batista seized control of Cuba in a 1952 coup.  A young revolutionary named Fidel Castro led the July 26 Movement in opposition.  Batista’s military resisted the movement.  Ike disapproved of Batista’s harsh methods and severed aid to his regime, helping Castro take power in January 1959.  Ike refused to allow Batista and his wife to enter the US, saying, “We can’t become a haven for displaced dictators who have robbed their countries.” (Sweig, Cuba: What Everyone Needs to Know)

• Ike’s administration was initially positive toward Castro.  They hoped Castro would establish free elections.  But he massacred Batista’s loyalists and told Nixon that the Cuban people did not trust elections.  Instead, he would run the country.  Ike was horrified by Castro’s mass executions and called the Cuban “a little Hitler.”  (Baier, Three Days in January)

• Ike knew Castro was viewed as a hero across Latin America.  He wrote, “They saw him as a champion of the downtrodden and the enemy of the privileged who, in most of their countries, controlled both wealth and governments. His crimes and wrongdoings that so repelled the more informed peoples of the continent had little effect on the young, the peons, the underprivileged, and all others who wanted to see the example of revolution followed in their own nations.”  (The Eisenhower Diaries)

• Ike gave Castro a year to prove he was not a communist.  Castro failed that test and expelled American diplomats.  Ike placed an embargo on Cuba in October 1960 and severed relations in January 1961.  3,000 Americans remained on the island, but Ike was not worried about them.  He thought that anyone who wanted to leave would have done so.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• Ike did not want to have to transfer the Cuba issue to the incoming Kennedy Administration.  He thought he could attack Cuba before leaving office if Castro gave him, “a really good excuse.”  If that did not happen, Ike speculated the US could “stage an attack” against its own interests that would justify an American invasion.  This did not happen.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• Ike and JFK discussed Cuba during the transition.  JFK asked if he should topple Castro.  Ike replied, “Yes, we cannot let the present government there go on.”  Ike explained that he had the CIA training an army of anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Guatemala that could be used against Castro.  But Ike said JFK could disband this force if he did not want to use them and that he had not yet devised a satisfactory plan.  He said there had to be a Cuban leader and government in exile who could replace Castro after the operation.  No such leader had emerged.  Unfortunately, JFK and his advisors misinterpreted what Ike was saying and thought he had endorsed what would become the Bay of Pigs.  (Gellman, The President and the Apprentice)

• JFK launched the Bay of Pigs in April 1961.  Castro’s forces thwarted the invasion, embarrassing JFK and the US.  Ike said the invasion failed because the rebels landed in a swampy region, the invaders lacked aggression, and the surprise appearance of Cuban jets.  Ike said the Bay of Pigs was a bigger embarrassment than the U2 Incident, writing, “Considering all the information we got out of the many, many U2 flights, what happened at Paris fades into significance. But here we gained nothing, and it made us look childish and ridiculous.”  (Eisenhower, Waging Peace)

• JFK met Ike at Camp David following the Bay of Pigs to discuss what went wrong.  Ike gave JFK the Abilene version of “I told you so.”  Kennedy explained that he had spoken to his advisors individually.  Ike replied that the president should have all his advisors debate the issue together.  The right answer would reveal itself.  Kennedy also said he did not deploy the Air Force because he wanted to keep America’s role a secret.  Ike dismissed this, saying that success was more important than secrecy.  He also warned JFK that the Soviets would try something in Cuba unusually bold after the Bay of Pigs. (Baier, Three Days in January)

• JFK put missiles in Turkey in June 1961 to boost his anti-communist image after the Bay of Pigs failed.  Ike had considered this move in 1959 but had decided it was too provocative, saying it was the equivalent of the Soviets putting missiles in Mexico or Cuba.  (Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President)

• Khrushchev decided that American missiles in Turkey was unacceptable and placed missiles in Cuba to force a trade.  JFK was determined to remove the Soviet missiles and debated options with his advisors.  Air strikes and quarantining the island became the two main options.

• The Cuban Missile Crisis took place during the 1962-midterm elections.  JFK campaigned for the Democrats and attacked Ike’s record.  Ike campaigned for the Republicans.  Relations between the two men as its nadir.  But CIA chief John McCone met with Ike and explained the developing situation in Cuba.  Ike feared JFK was using the crisis to help the Democrats in the midterms.  (David Eisenhower, Going Home to Glory)

• JFK called Ike several times during the crisis.  Ike recommended using diplomacy and the quarantine to remove the missiles.  If that failed, JFK should use air strikes because, “leaving these things on your flank is unacceptable.”  JFK asked if Khrushchev would respond by attacking West Berlin.  Ike said he did not think the Soviets saw Cuba and Berlin as interrelated, and that they only saw cold-blooded possibilities for expanding their influence.  He added he did not think the Soviets would use nuclear weapons, saying, “Something may make these people [the Soviets] shoot them off. I just don’t believe this will.”  (Conversation between Eisenhower and Kennedy, October 22, 1962)

• JFK quarantined the island, escalating the crisis.  Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message saying he wanted to swap Soviet missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey.  JFK accepted the deal over his advisors’ protests and called Ike to inform him.  Ike insisted that JFK get Khrushchev and Castro to agree to US inspections in Cuba to guarantee that the missiles were removed.  The inspections never happened but the missiles were dismantled.  (Baier, Three Days in January)

• The press hailed JFK’s handling of the Missile Crisis, but Ike disagreed. Kennedy had pledged not to invade Cuba without inspections, leading Ike to conclude that Khrushchev got the better deal.  (Ambrose, Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician)